British commerce as an anti-slavery device in Malawi by Lamba, I.C.
rhodesian
history
The Journal of The Central Africa Historical Association
Volume 9 1978
N. M. N. RALUSHAI
Traditions concerning Luvhimbi and 
the Mbedzi
I. C. LAMBA
British commerce as an anti-slavery 
device in Malawi
J. M. MACKENZIE 
Responsible Government
I. R. HANCOCK 
Capricorn Africa Society
H. H. PATEL 
Asian political activity in 
Rhodesia
Notes, Documents and Revisions
Essay Review
Reviews
Bibliography
_
RHODESIAN
HISTORY
The Journal of the Central Africa Historical Association
Edited by R. S. Roberts and P. R. Warhurst
Volume 9 1978
Further traditions concerning Luvhimbi and the Mbedzi. N. M. N.
RALUSHAI .............................................................................. 1
British commerce as an anti-slavery device in Malawi in the 1870s
and 1880s: A study in miscalculated strategy. I. C. LAMBA — 13
Southern Rhodesia and Responsible Government. J. M.
MACKENZIE ........................................    23
The Capricorn Africa Society in Southern Rhodesia. I. R.
HANCOCK .............................................................................. 41
Asian political activity in Rhodesia from the Second World War to
1972. H. H. PATEL        63
NOTES, DOCUMENTS AND REVISIONS
Cecil Rhodes: Some documents and reflections. G. SHEPPERSON 83
Firearms as a factor in Manyika politics from the sixteenth to the
early twentieth century. H. H. K. BHILA __ __ __ 91
A difference of opinion in the Colonial Office, 1893. S. B.
STEVENSON _  _  _  _  ...... __ 99
ESSAY REVIEW
The Tonga and the anthropologists. T. I. MATTHEWS_ __ 115
REVIEWS _ _  „  _  _  ...... 123
R. BLAKE, A History of Rhodesia by P. R. Warhurst; A. F. ISAAC- 
MAN, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique by P. R. Warhurst; 
M. GELFAND, A Non-Racial Island of Learning: A History of the 
University College of Rhodesia by T. O. Ranger; J. P. L. WALLIS and 
F. R. BRADLOW, Thomas Baines by R. S. Roberts; C. BLACK, The 
Legend of Lomagurtdi by R. S. Roberts; E. WASON, Banned by R. E. 
M. Songore.
BIBLIOGRAPHY io o
NEWS 131
Rhodesian History (1978), IX.
BRITISH COMMERCE AS AN ANTI-SLAVERY DEVICE 
IN MALAWI IN THE 1870s AND 1880s: A STUDY IN  
MISCALCULATED STRATEGY*
I. C. L amba
University of Malawi, Chancellor College
D u r in g  t h e  n in e t e e n t h  cantury the Industrial Revolution in Britain, 
as in other parts of Europe, intensified the search for sources of raw materials 
and markets abroad. The visit to Central Africa in 1859 of Livingstone and 
John Kirk led to the conviction that Malawi offered such economic opportuni­
ties and potential;' Livingstone in fact saw the British as destined for 'the 
largest [commercial] stake in the African Continent’.2 The British, however, 
misread the Malawian situation with the result that their commercial strate­
gies in the region were equally miscalculated.
In Central Africa, the function of British commerce, as advocated by 
Livingstone, was to go beyond mere commercial dealings and become the 
necessary means for the destruction of the slave trade. As in many parts 
of Africa, a complex situation existed in Malawi, Swahili commerce posed 
the greatest challenge to British economic enterprise; and since Swahili Arab 
commerce took much of its strength from the slave trade, it was only prud­
ent for the British to destroy the slave trade as a means of weakening the 
Swahili Arab commercial dominance. In pursuance of her official anti­
slavery policy, Britain willingly made available financial aid, albeit small, to 
any private British exploration abroad likely to lead eventually to commer­
cial expansion overseas under the banner of ‘anti-slavery crusaders’. It was 
in this spirit that the British proclaimed a subtle negrophile humanitarianism, 
the ultimate beneficiary of which would be British capitalists. However, the 
British anti-slavery commercial strategy in Malawi never succeeded in oust­
ing the Arab factor.
To the capitalist humanitarians British commerce stood as one of the 
most subtle and hopeful anti-slavery devices; for, while Christianity re­
presented an alien moral and religious concept to the Africans, trade was an
* Research for this paper was generously funded by the Canadian Commonwealth 
Scholarship and Fellowship Plan.
1 J. Kirk, ‘Report on the natural products and capabilities of the Shire and lower 
Zambesi Valleys’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society (1861-2), VI, O.S. 
25-35.
2 D. and C. Livingstone, Narrative of an Expedition to the Zambesi and Its Tribu­
taries, and of the Discovery of the Lakes Chiluia and Nyasa 1858-1864 (New York, 
Harper Brothers, 1866), 8.
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old occupation among the Maravi and Yao and so likely to be accepted as 
a continuation of the Africans’ commercial life. Moreover, British enterprise 
in this form was regarded by the humanitarians as a potent instrument for 
social change capable of striking at the root of the slave traffic — uncivilized 
life. The yardstick of African society’s progress towards civilization was the 
amount of the European goods purchased. The value of trade was to stimulate 
the African’s mind through commercial intercourse and the encouragement 
of an efficient division of labour;3 and the British after displacing the Arabs 
would, so it was argued, ultimately unite the Africans against the competi­
tive slave trade.
Common in nineteenth-century Britain, this pattern of thinking originated 
from the belief that the Africans’ own trade was of an atavistic and disrup­
tive nature which promoted divisiveness and inhibited any feelings of inter­
dependence between tribes. This alleged isolation was thought to be responsi­
ble for tribal animosities that created fertile conditions for the growth of the 
slave trade. British theorists never associated the slave trade with ethnic 
and class conflicts which often set one African group or family against 
another. British commerce, with its transforming power as a ‘social’ agency 
would turn Africans ‘into a body corporate of nations, no one member of 
which can suffer without the other suffering with it’.4 A ready and eager Afri­
can acceptance of legitimate commerce was generally assumed in humanitarian 
circles and no consideration was given to any adverse effects that the suppres­
sion of the slave trade or the introduction of ‘legitimate’ commerce might 
have upon African life. The proponents of legitimate trade attacked the in­
dependence of the traditional socio-political systems where slave holding 
represented an important symbol of status and power. For the chiefs to em­
brace a commerce demanding renunciation of ‘slavery’, however, was tanta­
mount to destroying their own social foundations. Little did the British 
understand the operation of slavery in African society. For example, domestic 
slavery and its closely allied clientage system represented devices among 
some African peoples for absorbing, assimilating and socializing other ethnic 
groups or their remnants into social cohesion. It thus also had the positive 
effect of turning Africans into what Livingstone called ‘a body corporate’. 
In sum, African slavery and the slave trade posed the greatest obstacle and 
challenge to any planned British commercial imperialism in the continent.
The advocacy of British commerce in Malawi embraced a wide variety 
of interests ranging from missionary to adventurer. To the missionaries,
a Sec, for example, F. Holmwood, Introduction to J. F. Elton, Travels and Re­
searches among the Lakes and Mountains of Eastern Africa, ed. H. B. CotteriU (London, 
J. Murray, 1879), 19-20: ‘there is a trait in the character of Africans generally which 
has done much to keep them in a universal state of barbarism . . .  it is a disinclination 
to any settled employment no matter what the incentive to labour . . .  a consequence 
of generations of slavery’.
* Livingstone, Narrative of an Expedition, 28.
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since their arrival in 1875, it was clear from the Africans’ religious and com­
mercial background that material wants preceded Christian spiritual needs. 
This assessment was shared by both Stewart and Laws of Livingstonia;5 
and the missionaries had to meet the Africans’ material needs. In order that 
Christianity be propagated, missionaries in fact became the strongest ad­
vocates of British commercial imperialism. African chiefs could be won to 
Christendom only after they had seen the material benefits likely to accrue 
from the new faith; and the support of the chiefs was crucial to the success 
of any foreign economic enterprise. Stewart believed in the inseparability 
of religion and secular commerce. In a long and significant letter to the 
Livingstonia Committee in Glasgow, appealing for a trading company, 
Stewart emphasized his stand:
No sermons or daily lectures on the benefits of industry and the 
sin of idleness would accomplish one twentieth part of the good 
that would be achieved by a simple depot of goods here [Malawi], 
where people could get what they want in return for what they 
have . . . What is the use of talking to a man in this state [of 
poverty] about things utterly beyond his comprehension at first; 
and assuring him that you are his friend, and that you seek his 
good, when you cannot supply him with the very simplest means 
of raising him above the state in which you find him? If a man is 
naked . . . give him calico and not words.6
Ironic yet pragmatic, such an argument had its base beyond mere commer­
cial considerations of the African’s welfare. Quite a significant factor was 
the growing Arab and Yao commercial activity which at this time seriously 
threatened British attempts to spread their influence. The continued African 
response to Arab trade was evident in 1876, when the Yao at the Lake 
openly declared: ‘We can get anything from the Arabs we want. We can 
get nothing from you. They are our friends even though they sometimes take 
away our people.’7 Also of course, there was the Portuguese trade, active 
south of the Swahili Arab commercial zone.
The Arab popularity in the 1870s stemmed from not only their posses­
sion and distribution of guns and gunpowder but also their trade goods. To 
displace the Arabs and win the Africans, the British logically needed to pro­
vide the African market with the same popular Arab goods, such as hatchets, 
knives, cloth, looking-glasses and beads. On the purely trading side, the 
British commercial strategy was well planned at a time when relations be­
tween Malawians and Arabs very rarely rose above the commercial level.
s J. Stewart, Dawn in the Dark Continent of Africa and Its Missions (New York, 
Young Peoples’ Missionary Movement, 1902), 217-18.
s Stewart in the Free Church of Scotland Monthly Record (May 1873), 110-13 
quoted in H. W. Macmillan, ‘A Sketch of the African Lakes Company 1878-93’ (Univ. 
of Malawi, Chancellor Coll., Seminar Paper, 1968), 2.
7 Stewart in Glasgow Herald, 11 Nov. 1876, cited in Macmillan, ‘A Sketch of the 
African Lakes Company’,2.
When Young approached the Yao chief Mponda about the traffic, Mponda’s 
reaction was a categorical statement: he sold slaves to procure goods ob­
tainable only in this manner.8
In this situation H. B. Cotterill, a son of the Bishop of Edinburgh, antici­
pating great profits, brought into Malawi a steel boat and Manchester goods 
worth £500 for the purchase of African products like ivory and cotton. Like 
most British traders, Cotterill was convinced of the fantastic commercial 
potential of Malawi, particularly in the region of the Lake. The prosperity 
of the Swahili Arab and Yao trade in the area seemed to confirm the likely 
positive commercial advantage to British trade in displacing the rivals. 
However, the problems slowly became obvious: the Portuguese control of 
the Zambezi, the main route of access to the region, which entailed pro­
hibitive Portuguese customs; the obstacle course of the journey from the 
Murchison Cataracts to the navigable portion of the Upper Shire, and the 
active Swahili traffic. Although it cannot be said with certainty that the 
slave trade constituted the larger part of their rivals’ profits, the British 
tactics, aimed at breaking the commercial hegemony of the Portuguese, 
Arabs and Yao, involved treating all three as slave traders. Cotterill’s venture 
ended in a fiasco but J. F. Elton, the British Consul at Mozambique, and 
Captain Verney Cameron,® the famous transafrican explorer, never faltered 
in their strong belief of commercial prospects in Malawi along the lines of 
Stewart’s suggestions.
Legitimate commerce in Malawi was strongly identified with Protestant 
missionary goals. Determined to make Malawi a Protestant rather than a 
Catholic stronghold, British commerce would have confronted any Portu­
guese competition even in the absence of any likelihood of substantial pro­
fits, as such a venture represented largely a ‘humanitarian’ endeavour. Thus 
although the formation in 1878 of the African Lakes Company, initially 
named the Livingstonia Central Africa Company, coincided with the general 
British capitalist activity in Africa, the Company was an organization 
prodded into existence by missionaries to operate as a commercial extension 
of Livingstonia Mission in an attempt to make the British presence felt locally 
both on the commercial and spiritual fronts.
With a slender capital of £20 000 from a group of Glasgow merchants 
and under the chairmanship of James Stevenson, the Livingstonia Mission 
Convener, the Lakes Company was for fifteen years the sole commercial en­
terprise of its kind in Malawi. The Company’s objectives aimed at developing 
British trade and exploiting the country’s resources were stated as follows: *
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* E. D. Young, Nyasa: A Journal of Adventure (London, J. Murray, 1877), 77. 
s See V. L. Cameron, ‘Trade in Central Africa: Present and future’, The Journal 
of the Royal Society of Arts (1877), XXV, 162-71.
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The navigation of the Rivers and Lakes of Central Africa, and 
especially those rivers and lakes, which communicate with the 
Indian Ocean by the River Zambezi and of the River Zambezi 
itself, with a view to develop the trade and resources of the country 
and to encourage legitimate traffic among the natives.10 *
Granted the use of the Livingstonia steamer, Ilala, and under the joint 
managership of John and Frederick Moir, the Company rapidly extended its 
commercial activities from its headquarters in Blantyre to Karonga in the 
north, with stores operating at Blantyre, Livingstonia (Cape Maclear) and 
Karonga itself. By the end of 1879 the Company’s plans included expansion 
to Lake Tanganyika and the launching of a trade ship on the lake to serve 
the London Missionary Society settled at Ujiji in 1876" and James Steven­
son personally contributed £4 000 for road construction between Lakes 
Malawi and Tanganyika to facilitate trading stations from across the corridor 
down to the Shire River in order to block the Arab routes and intercept 
ivory trade from the west. The Lakes Company strongly believed in a strategy 
which would not only cut off the Arab dominated coast-bound traffic but 
also create for itself a brisk ivory trade with the western tribes.
This awkwardly expensive plan to obstruct slave routes, however, in­
dicated British misjudgement of the practical aspects of the slave trade. For 
example, the alleged inseparability of the ivory and the slave trade, a com­
mon British misconception, led to the unrealistic conclusion that cutting off 
the flow of ivory across the corridor and at the south end of Lake Malawi 
would effectively destroy the slave trade: ‘By [the British] purchasing ivory 
. . .  the slave trade would be rendered unprofitable, for it is only by the 
ivory being carried by the slaves that the latter [slaves] do not eat up the 
profits of a trip’.'2 That the slave trade partially originated in the caravan 
trade is known only too well except that it is now established that many 
ivory porters were paid labour. Therefore, undue emphasis on this view led 
to the false conclusion that exhaustion of ivory in the interior would auto­
matically doom the slave trade. The evidence available18 fails to support 
this reasoning, for ivory and slaves had been detached from each other at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. In fact, from the 1840s, the Yao 
slave forays, now concentrated east of the Lake,14 *bore no relationship to 
ivory. On the contrary extensive ivory purchasing by the British leading to
io Cited in Macmillan, ‘A Sketch of the African Lakes Company’, 5.
it See N. Bennett, Introduction to A. J. Swann, Fighting the Slave Hunters in 
Central Africa (London, Frank Cass, Reprint, 1969), esp. vii-xi.
i* Livingstone, Narrative of an Expedition, 140.
is In 1866 all the slaves Livingstone met between the east coast and Lake Malawi 
carried slave sticks and not ivory, The Last Journal of Livingstone in Central Africa. 
ed. H. Waller (New York, Harper, 1875), 1-183.
14 Great Britain, Correspondence with the British Commissioners . . . and from
British Naval Officers Relating to the Slave Trade . . . 1865, 175, Playfair to Russell,
30 May 1865 (H.C. 1866, lxxv, 1).
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the depletion of the commodity forced many African tribes, including the 
Yao, into the slave trade.
The common failure on the part of the British to distinguish between 
slave and ivory caravans led to gross strategic miscalculations. To most 
of the British and indeed the Lakes Company, caravans, always associated 
with evil Arab commerce, were invariably ‘black and white ivory’. No pro­
per distinction — and possibly calculatedly so — was made between slave 
and ivory caravans, or between slave and paid ivory porters. However, as 
Consul Churchill at Zanzibar observed, it was
an error to think that the slaves brought down to the coast are 
made to carry ivory. They are brought down in gangs chained to­
gether lest they should run away, and they are so poorly fed on 
the way that they can scarcely carry their weight when they reach 
Kilwa.'*
Slaves meant for the market never carried ivory which in any case had its 
own depot at the coast.’8 That ivory porterage was a specialized task was 
illustrated by Tippu Tip, the great Arab trader in Katanga, who preferred 
hired Nyamwezi porters to emaciated'7 slaves for hauling his heavy ivory 
tusks of sixty pounds each to the coast. To the Nyamwezi, porterage re­
presented a prestigious occupation which elevated a man’s social status. 
Admittedly, selling both the ivory tusk and its porter was a temptation, but 
hired porters rarely ended up in coastal slave barracoons. The effective­
ness of the African Lakes Company’s plan to intercept slave exports by 
purchasing the ivory was only a myth perpetrated by the merchants to justify 
the commercial warfare in which they were engaged.
The launching of the Lakes Company was a commercial breakthrough 
after protracted negotiations over matters of navigation and customs between 
the British and the Portuguese Governments; but it encouraged fundamental 
obstacles which almost wrecked the Company by 1884. The trading and 
navigational monopoly along the Zambezi granted to the Portuguese mer­
chants, Anahory and Zagury, was broken up in 1878, and Morier, the 
British Minister in Lisbon, had succeeded in securing for the Company a 
substantial reduction of the Zambezi transit duty from the standard 30 per 
cent to 3 per cent; but the financially weak Company failed to establish 
deep and lasting commercial relations with the Africans. With its pitifully 
small capital of £20 000 the Lakes Company, working under pressing cir­
cumstances of competition with the centuries-old Arab commerce, lacked 
adequate money and men, a weakness responsible for the Company’s trans­
formation from a trading concern to a para-military force to displace the
>3 Great Britain, Correspondence with British Ministers and Agents . . . Relating 
to the Slave Trade . . .  1868, 804, Churchill to Seer. Bombay Govt. 4 Mar. 1868 (H.C. 
1868-9, lvi, 729).
>6 Ibid., 806, Churchill to Lord Stanley, F.O., 21 Aug. 1868. 
it R. W. Beachey, ‘The East African ivorv trade in the nineteenth century’, The 
Journal of African History (1967), VIII, 269-90.
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Swahili. Nevertheless, in contrast to the Arabs, the Company had several 
advantages including the support of the British Government, a monopoly 
of missionary commerce, large capital investments by Arab or African 
standards and the use of a missionary vessel. However, in commercial terms, 
the Company’s operation proved disappointing, largely owing to British 
misconceptions of the local Afro-Arab commercial ties in Malawi.
Events of the first five years led the Company into business measures 
of total folly, such as the attempted construction of expensive roads to Lake 
Tanganyika and Dar es Salaam which collapsed because of lack of funds 
and the death of European technicians.18 This, coupled with gross mis­
management, brought the Company to the verge of bankruptcy early in the 
1880s. Its recourse to arms, as demonstrated in the Arab War at Karonga, 
was a total departure from its intended role; but this was the last desperate 
attempt to use whatever remained of its capital after nine years of un­
successful effort to eliminate its Afro-Arab commercial competitors.19 What 
came to be known as the Arab or Mlozi War, which marked the climax of 
this transformation into a military force, is an important area for further 
research to rectify the largely biased traditional British accounts of its 
origins.20 The war had far-reaching consequences upon the small British 
population in Malawi who initially welcomed it as a timely crusade against 
‘Arab slavers’.*1
The Arab trade links with the Ngonde of Karonga were old;22 when 
the Company’s permanent agent, Low Monteith Fotheringham, arrived at 
the ivory-rich Karonga in 1884, the Swahili Arabs from Usenga under Mlozi
ib The Stevenson Road was abandoned after only forty miles of construction from 
Karonga.
'» Only a commercial monopoly, with power to oblige the Africans to pay whatever 
the prices charged, would have enabled the African Lakes Company to prosper. An 
interesting comparison is the Royal Niger Company; see J. E. Flint, Sir George Goldie 
and the Making of Nigeria (London, Oxford Univ. Press, West African History Series, 
1960).
bo See for example, F. J. D. Lugard, The Rise of Our Eastern African Empire: 
Early Efforts in Nyasaland and Uganda (London, W. Blackwood, 2 vols, 1893),!, 
ch. 3-8; L. Monteith Fotheringham, Adventures in Nyasaland: A Two Years’ Struggle 
with Arab Slave Dealers in Central Africa (London, Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and 
Rivington, 1891), ch. 3-19; Sir Harry H. Johnston, British Central Africa (London, 
Methuen, 1897), ch. 4; Johnston was more objective in his assessment than most 
British writers on the subject. Recent and useful research contributions to the 
topic are by H. W. Macmillan, ‘Notes on the origin of the Arab War’, in B. Pachai 
(ed.) Jsarly History of Malawi (London, Longman, 1972), 263-82 and “The Origins 
and Development of the African Lakes Company 1878-1908’ (Univ. of Edinburgh, 
unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1979), ch. 4-5 ; O. J. Kalinga, ‘The Ngonde Kingdom of Northern 
Malawi c. 1600-1895’ (Univ. of London, unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, 1974), ch.7, which throws 
new light on the intricate tribal balance of power operating in Ungonde.
2< W. P. Livingstone, Laws of Livingstoniu: A Narrative of Missionary Adventure 
and Achievement (London, Hodder Stoughton, 1922), ch. 17, ‘War with the Arab 
Slavers’. A general worry among the British was caused by the possibility of an interior 
Arab domination in the 1880s in response to the European scramble for Africa.
22 See Kalinga, ‘The Ngonde Kingdom’, 238-41. Also M. Wilson, ‘Reflections on 
the early history of North Malawi’, in Pachai, Early History of Malawi, 136-48 ; M. 
Wright and P. Lary, ‘Swahili settlements in North Zambia and Malawi’, African 
Historical Studies, (1971), IV, 547-74.
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had in fact already been given land for settlement by the Ngonde ruler, the 
Kyungu. The chief’s gesture undoubtedly demonstrated the depth of African 
confidence in the Swahili Arabs and presented a threat to the Company 
which sought to destroy Arab popularity and commercial power.
On the other hand the Swahili Arabs were not necessarily anti-British 
at this time. They treated European traders in the same way as their African 
allies and sought collaboration where it was mutually beneficial. In fact, 
despite their anti-slavery policy, the British in the Nyasa-Tanganyika corridor 
occasionally fraternized with the Arabs. The co-existence of the two groups 
at Ujiji where the London Missionary Society operated lends support to the 
point, and this state of relations went on until the later 1880s. At Karonga 
itself a vigorous Anglo-Arab trade in ivory and gunpowder*3 flourished even 
after 1883. But as the Company faced bankruptcy it came to believe more 
strongly that the elimination of the Swahili Arabs and their collaborators 
was essential to its continued operation. As a missionary-dominated company, 
it found it easy enough to refurbish the Arab slaver image under the banner 
of humanitarianism as a convenient pretext for war to ensure its survival and 
to detach the Ngonde from their Arab alliance in order to monopolize the 
Ngonde trade.
The causes of the war have been explained in part as Arab aggression 
aimed at consolidation of political power inland after 1884 in response to 
German imperialism and callous treatment in East Africa; but such external 
factors had little, if any, bearing upon the situation at Karonga, which was 
determined by local factors, notably a precarious tribal balance of power 
that played into the hands of an incompetent but aggressive trading company. 
The Company’s injudicious involvement in local political relationships at 
Karonga led to its final adventure in alliance and war. Its local political 
grip, through Fotheringham’s and Nicoll’s treaties with the Ngonde chiefs, 
gave the local Africans legitimate hope of protection, not, paradoxically, 
against the Swahili Arabs, but against the Ngoni, Kanyoli’s Henga and 
the Ruga-ruga.24 The Henga had been welcomed by the Ngonde because of 
the depredations and harsh rule of the Ngoni in the Nkhamanga region in 
the south. Thus well received, the Henga settled in a strategic position in 
northern Karonga to form a buffer against enemies of the Ngonde, such 
as the Nyakusa and Ngoni, and represented an important factor in the poli­
tical stability and defence of the Ngonde. The situation changed with an 
alliance between the Henga and the Arabs which naturally imposed a 
strain on the formerly cordial relations between the Ngonde and the Arabs. 23*
23 J. Stewart, ‘Survey of the eastern coast of Lake Nyasa, and the latest news of 
the “Lake-junction Road” ’, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society (1883), V, 
N.S., 689.
2* The Ruga-ruga were a band of mercenaries comprising numerous tribes, though 
dominated by the Nyamwezi, and serving, without political or tribal affiliation, anyone 
capable of sustaining them.
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The position in Karonga became complicated by the advent of the Lakes 
Company which brought together the former enemies, the Ngonde and the 
Nyakusa, through paternalistic friendship with both of them. This situation 
was seen by the Henga as a betrayal by the Ngonde of their earlier friend­
ship with them.
The Company had now set the stage for its involvement, direct or in­
direct, in local feuds. Any conflict between the Ngonde and the Nyakusa, 
or between them and the Swahili Arabs or Henga, would draw the Company 
to the aid of its allies. The Arab and Ngonde clashes which began on 27 
October 1888 presented the awaited opportunity for the British to exercise 
their implied responsibility for defending their Ngonde allies. To the Com­
pany the war brought the chance to eliminate the Swahili Arabs, its major 
commercial rival, and secure a monopoly of trade with the African tribes. 
The Company’s high-handedness, diplomatic incompetence, hypocritical 
war aims and overestimation of its capability, however, turned the conflict 
into a war of attrition from which no single party emerged victorious. Only 
the diplomatic intervention of Harry Johnston, with his treaty with Mlozi 
of 22 December 1889,25 ended the war. The treaty, which had momentarily 
succeeded in redefining and settling Anglo-Arab-Ngonde relations,26 was 
greeted with severe criticism from the missionaries for its failure to evict 
the Arabs altogether from Karonga. The failure of the Company’s commercial 
imperialism was a blow to the religious imperialism of the missionaries. As 
Stewart had believed, the Africans were likely to become totally dependent 
upon the missionaries for their spiritual needs only after their material needs 
had been met. But Johnston’s action salvaged the Company at a time when 
defeat of the Arabs was a remote possibility. Estimated at £15 000, the war 
expenditure was in fact already in excess of the Company’s assets. The diver­
sion of the energy of the small, inefficient staff into the pursuit of the war 
halted all its normal trading activities.
The Lakes Company, weak financially and lacking trading expertise, 
could not as yet meet the commercial competition of the Arabs whose local 
support continued unabated. After its own dismal failure in commercial 
domination, the amalgamation of the Lakes Company with the British 
South Africa Company on 29 April 1890 brought the era of purely ‘Christian 
commerce’ to an end; henceforth Cecil John Rhodes and Harry Johnston 
worked relentlessly for complete British control over Malawi, epitomized by 
the declaration of a British Protectorate over the country in 1891.
25 Details in Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office, Confidential Print, 
403/127, H. H. Johnston to Foreign Office, ‘Report on the Nyasa-Tanganyika Expedi­
tion 1889-90.’
26 The Ngonde now to return to their villages would not be molested by the 
Arabs or their allies who would no longer build north of the Rukuru River or south 
within three miles of the Tanganyika road. Either Kopa-kopa’s or Msalema’s village 
would be evacuated within a year. See Lugard, The Rise of Our Eastern African Empire, 
I, 160.
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